Artigo de Bruce Schneider no The Guardian, mostra que as pervasivas câmeras de vigilância têm pouca efetividade (resolvendo alguns crimes aqui e ali), representando um enorme gasto para as coletividades e podendo servir para bisbiblhotar a vida alheia, criar vídeos “best videos”, ou espionar políticos e mais ainda, criar uma sensação de medo e paranóia, o “sujeito inseguro”, como discutimos em post a partir da palestra de Mireille Rosello. Muitas imagens não são sequer verificadas e quando são, não servem para nada. Mas uma vez, questiona-se a eficiência desse panóptico eletrônico.
Police officers monitor CCTV screens in the control room at New Scotland Yard in London.
Photograph: Kirsty Wigglesworth/AFP/Getty
Trechos da matéria:
“(…) This fact has been demonstrated again and again: by a comprehensive study for the Home Office in 2005, by several studies in the US, and again with new data announced last month by New Scotland Yard. They actually solve very few crimes, and their deterrent effect is minimal.
(…) Additionally, while a police officer on the street can respond to a crime in progress, the same officer in front of a CCTV screen can only dispatch another officer to arrive much later. By their very nature, cameras result in underused and misallocated police resources.
(…) We live in a unique time in our society: the cameras are everywhere, and we can still see them. Ten years ago, cameras were much rarer than they are today. And in 10 years, they’ll be so small you won’t even notice them. Already, companies like L-1 Security Solutions are developing police-state CCTV surveillance technologies like facial recognition for China, technology that will find their way into countries like the UK. The time to address appropriate limits on this technology is before the cameras fade from notice.”